This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk
I compare how two leading French phenomenologists of the last century – Michel Henry and Henri Maldiney – interpret Kandinsky’s heritage. Henry’s phenomenology is based on a distinction between two main modes of manifestation – the ordinary one, that is, the manifestation of the world and the “manifestation of life”; for him Kandinsky’s work provides a paradigmatic example of the second, more original, mode of manifestation, which is free from all forms of self-alienation. This is why Kandinsky’s paintings do no show us anything, but rather provoke in us certain impressions, certain feelings; they should be experienced, lived through. Henry claims that this living-though of the work of art is transformative; it is a kind of ascetic practice or mystical experience that goes beyond the distinction of the subject and the object. Maldiney also recognises in Kandinsky’s work an attempt to provide an access to an a-cosmic and a-historic experience of one’s inner self; yet for Maldiney this is not a positive characteristic. For Maldiney, the key distinction is not between modes of phenomenalisation, but between two dimensions of meaning (sens): the ordinary one, that he calls “gnostic” (gnosique), and “pathic”. This pathic dimension of meaning can be reached only in a personal contact with the living-world in its nascent state. According to Maldiney, there is no radical self-transformation which is not a transformation of one’s being-in- the-world and one’s meaning of the world (and vice versa). My access to myself cannot bypass my relation to the world, and so Kandinsky’s paintings cannot induce a true transformation of self. The disagreement of Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky doesn’t unfold on the level of the phenomenological description of the concrete aesthetic experience, but rather on the level of metaphysics.
Patrick O’Connor – “The Phenomenology of the Unconscious in Cormac McCarthy’s Kekulé Problem”
Interview: Patrick O’Connor on Cormac McCarthy and Philosophy
Rachel Coventry: Can Poetry break the Internet: A Heideggerian account of Post-Internet Poetry
Katrin Joost: Photographic Phenomenology
Jonathon Tuckett: The Talos Principle: When does a bot become a person?
Miles Kennedy: Where learning takes place: A phenomenological description of Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development
Emma Williams: The Ways We Think: Epistemology, Phenomenology and Education
Ingrid Wilkinson: Post-stroke changes in the embodied experience of walking
Valeria Bizzari: Phenomenology and its usefulness in psychopathology: an “embodied” proposal
Philip Tovey: A Remote Outpost Under Siege
Bernardo Ainbinder: Heidegger on colour-perception. A case for conceptualism in phenomenology
Bence Marosan: Phenomenological biology: A proposal for future phenomenology
Ashika L. Singh: Dwelling, Building and Homelessness
Emiliano Trizio: Science, Metaphysics and the Crisis of Rationality
Eric Chelstrom: Seriality and We-Intentions: A Sartrean Contribution to Collective Intentionality
Darian Meacham – How Low Can You Go? BioEnactivism, Phenomenology and Cognitive Biology
Felix Ó Murchadha – Speaking after the Phenomenon: Faith and the Passion of Being
Join Podbean Ads Marketplace and connect with engaged listeners.
Advertise Today
Create your
podcast in
minutes
It is Free
Mayo Clinic Talks
The Saad Truth with Dr. Saad
Positive Thinking Mind
The Jordan B. Peterson Podcast
The Mel Robbins Podcast