Yevamot 25 - April 1, 29 Adar 2

Today’s daf is sponsored by Elisheva Gray in honor of Avivah Zornberg. “Mazal tov to my dear teacher and friend on the birth of your new book! Todah Rabah for continuing to illuminate the pages of Torah with your unique voice, your grace and your deep well of Jewish and worldly wisdom. Mazal tov, and may you go from strength to strength.”

If one is suspected of having had a sexual relationship with a married woman, she needs to get divorced from her husband and if she marries the other man, she is forced to get divorced. According to Rav, this is case where there were witnesses and it is clear that she committed adultery. On the previous daf, Rav Sheshet questions this understanding based on a braita and the Gemara answers for Rav. Another braita is also brought to raise a doubt on Rav. Two answers are brought – either the case is referring to a different scenario or the braita is Rebbi’s opinion but Rav disagrees. Rebbi is quoted in a braita as taking suspicions seriously when one has reason to think his wife has been with another man. The halacha is like Rebbi and Rav – how can that be? It depends on whether the rumor stops immediately or continues. What is considered “immediately”? The Mishna in Gitin 45b brings two cases – a husband who divorces his wife as he suspects her of cheating on him or because of vows she made. He is not allowed to remarry her if he wishes to. Raba bar Huna questions: What if he remarries her anyway, do they have to get divorced? Can we use the case in our Mishna (where we force the second husband – the one suspected of cheating with her - to divorce her) to answer the question? Are the cases comparable? If one brings a get from overseas and says it was written and signed in front of him (a requirement for a get brought from overseas) or he testifies that her husband died or he killed her husband on his own or with others, the woman is free to marry anyone except for him, since the evidence relies solely on him and therefore there is concern he is lying out of self-interest. Rabbi Yehuda doesn’t accept his testimony at all if he says “I killed her." How can we accept his testimony at all if he says “I killed her”, according to Tana Kama – as according to Rav Yosef, if one testifies that someone sodomized him willingly, his testimony is not accepted as he is making himself into a sinner and one who sins is not an acceptable witness! So why here, is his testimony acceptable? Do we need to say that RavYosef holds like Rabbi Yehuda or can it be explained in some other way? Perhaps we can distinguish between testimony to “free” a woman from being an aguna and the case of sodomy. Why does the Mishna mention both cases of “I killed her” and “we killed her”? What is the difference? If a chacham couldn’t nullify the vow of a woman who forbade herself to her husband, therefore causing them to divorce, he cannot marry her. But if he was on a court in front of which she refused marriage to her husband (miun) or performed chalitza, he can. Can we infer from here that on can nullify a vow before one person – if so, in what situation? Is it only in front of three people that we don’t suspect him of self-interest? In another source, it seems to indicate two is enough! In all these cases, if he married her anyway, does he have to divorce her? Can it be derived from the previous Mishna and if so, from what case?