By Alyssa Scharpf, Ali Raja and Sanath Jaishankar
This episode addresses how the IMF conceptualises creditworthiness. We make the case that the IMF is allowing subjectivity within this, informed by ideological culture and geopolitical interests. Ultimately, this creates a self-reinforcing system of knowledge production, and leads to a loss of policy autonomy for African countries. The podcast concludes the IMF prescribes the ways in which developing countries fit into the global hierarchy.
Notes and references:
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15. “What Is the 'Gentleman's Agreement'?” Bretton Woods Project, 28 Oct. 2021, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/07/what-is-the-gentlemans-agreement/.
16. Woods, Ngaire. The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers. Cornell University Press, 2014.
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