221. Free Will’s Boundaries and Paradoxes feat. Alfred Mele
What is free will, and how can it be both tested and defined? How do you know where the line is between what is your choice, what is compelled, and what is inevitable? What are the limits on the will, and how do you study them?
Alfred Mele is a ph professor of philosophy at Florida State University. He also served as director of the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project and the Big Questions in Free Will Project. Alfred has written thirteen books and over 250 articles. His latest book is Free Will: An Opinionated Guide.
Alfred and Greg talk about the definitions of free will, and how different schools of thought define it differently. They discuss different views on the subject of determinism, the case of Martin Luther, and about the connections between free will and willpower.
Episode Quotes:Is the problem of self-deception similar to the problem of self-control?
23:38: There is a connection between self-deception and weakness of will. And so, between self-deception and self-control, too, because weakness of will and self-control are two sides of the same coin. So in cases of weakness of will, you judge it better to A than B, but you do B instead of A because you're more strongly motivated to do that. So it's a kind of motivated irrationality. And it looks like self-deception involves motivated irrationality too.
37:10: Behavior is in general driven by the stronger desire, but the stronger desire isn't always in line with what you think is best.
12:19: If we're thinking, "Well, you're not morally responsible for doing a thing unless you do it freely," then the low bar for moral responsibility becomes a low bar for freedom too.
Different features of desire
18:14: There are desires that you have, and they have different features. They have a causal power, which is the power to cause a corresponding action, and then they have your ranking of it in terms of value or goodness.
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