Ian Goldberg, Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format
Mix networks, originally proposed in 1981, provide a way for Internetusers to send messages--such as email, blog posts, or tweets--withoutautomatically revealing their identities or their locations. In thistalk, we will describe Sphinx, a cryptographic message format used torelay anonymized messages within a mix network. It is the first schemeto support a full set of security features: compactness, efficiency,provable security, indistinguishable replies, hiding the path length andrelay position, as well as providing unlinkability for each leg of themessage's journey over the network. We will compare Sphinx to other mixformats, and will also briefly outline Sphinx's security reductionproof. About the speaker: Ian Goldberg is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at theUniversity of Waterloo, where he is a founding member of theCryptography, Security, and Privacy (CrySP) research group. He holds aPh.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, where he discoveredserious weaknesses in a number of widely deployed security systems,including those used by cellular phones and wireless networks. He alsostudied electronic cash, as well as systems for protecting the personalprivacy of Internet users; this led to his role as Chief Scientist atZero-Knowledge Systems (now known as Radialpoint). His researchcurrently focusses on developing usable and useful technologies to helpInternet users maintain their security and privacy.
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