FBI v. Fikre (No Fly List)

 Respondent Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, brought suit alleging that the government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. In his complaint, Mr. Fikre alleged that he traveled from his home in Portland, Oregon to Sudan in 2009 to pursue business opportunities there. At a visit to the U. S. embassy, two FBI agents informed Mr. Fikre that he could not return to the United States because the government had placed him on the No Fly List. The agents questioned him extensively about the Portland mosque he attended, and they offered to take steps to remove him from the No Fly List if he agreed to become an FBI informant and to report on other members of his religious community. Mr. Fikre refused. He then traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where he alleges authorities interrogated and detained him for 106 days at the behest of the FBI. Unable to fly back to the United States, he ended up in Sweden, where he remained until February 2015. While there, he filed this suit, alleging that the government had violated his rights to procedural due process by failing to provide either meaningful notice of his addition to the No Fly List or any appropriate way to secure redress. He further alleged that the government had placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons related to his race, national origin, and religious beliefs. Mr. Fikre sought, among other things, an injunction prohibiting the government from keeping him on the No Fly List and a declaratory judgment confirming the government had violated his rights. In May 2016, the government notified Mr. Fikre that he had been removed from the No Fly List and sought dismissal of his suit in district court, arguing that its administrative action had rendered the case moot. The district court agreed with the government, but the Ninth Circuit  reversed, holding that a party seeking to moot a case based on its own voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must show that the conduct cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” 904 F. 3d 1033, 1039. On remand, the government submitted a declaration asserting that, based on the currently available information, Mr. Fikre would not be placed on the No Fly List in the future, and the district court again dismissed Mr. Fikre’s claim as moot. The Ninth Circuit once again reversed, holding that the government had failed to meet its burden because the declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Mr. Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. 35 F. 4th 762, 770–772. 

Held: The government has failed to demonstrate that this case is moot. A court with jurisdiction has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear and resolve questions properly before it. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). But the converse is also true as a federal court must dismiss a case that is moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013). The limited authority vested in federal courts by Article III of the U. S. Constitution to decide cases and controversies means that federal courts may no more pronounce on past actions that have no “continuing effect” in the world than they may neglect their obligation to hear and resolve questions properly before them. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18. This does not imply that a defendant may “automatically moot a case” by the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued. Instead, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice” will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189.