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Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Believing In, published by AnnaSalamon on February 8, 2024 on LessWrong.
"In America, we believe in driving on the right hand side of the road."
Tl;dr: Beliefs are like bets (on outcomes the belief doesn't affect). "Believing in"s are more like kickstarters (for outcomes the believing-in does affect).
Epistemic status: New model; could use critique.
In one early CFAR test session, we asked volunteers to each write down something they believed. My plan was that we would then think together about what we would see in a world where each belief was true, compared to a world where it was false.
I was a bit flummoxed when, instead of the beliefs-aka-predictions I had been expecting, they wrote down such "beliefs" as "the environment," "kindness," or "respecting people." At the time, I thought this meant that the state of ambient rationality was so low that people didn't know
"beliefs" were supposed to be predictions, as opposed to
group affiliations.
I've since changed my mind. My new view is that there is not one but two useful kinds of vaguely belief-like thingies - one to do with predictions and Bayes-math, and a different one I'll call "believing in." I believe both are lawlike, and neither is a flawed attempt to imitate/parasitize the other. I further believe both can be practiced at once - that they are distinct but compatible.
I'll be aiming, in this post, to give a clear concept of "believing in," and to get readers' models of "how to 'believe in' well" disentangled from their models of "how to predict well."
Examples of "believing in"
Let's collect some examples, before we get to theory. Places where people talk of "believing in" include:
An individual stating their personal ethical code. E.g., "I believe in being honest," "I believe in hard work," "I believe in treating people with respect," etc.
A group stating the local social norms that group tries to practice as a group. E.g., "Around here, we believe in being on time."
"I believe in you," said by one friend or family member to another, sometimes in a specific context ("I believe in your ability to win this race,") sometimes in a more general context ("I believe in you [your abilities, character, and future undertakings in general]").
A difficult one-person undertaking, of the sort that'll require cooperation across many different time-slices of a self. ("I believe in this novel I'm writing.")
A difficult many-person undertaking. ("I believe in this village"; "I believe in America"; "I believe in CFAR"; "I believe in turning this party into a dance party, it's gonna be awesome.")
A political party or platform ("I believe in the Democratic Party"). A scientific paradigm.
A person stating which entities they admit into their hypotheses, that others may not ("I believe in atoms"; "I believe in God").
It is my contention that all of the above examples, and indeed more or less all places where people naturally use the phrase "believing in," are attempts to invoke a common concept, and that this concept is part of how a well-designed organism might work.[1]
Inconveniently, the converse linguistic statement does not hold - that is:
People who say "believing in" almost always mean the thing I'll call "believing in"
But people who say "beliefs" or "believing" (without the "in") sometimes mean the Bayes/predictions thingy, and sometimes mean the thing I'll call "believing in." (For example, "I believe it takes a village to raise a child" is often used to indicate "believing in" a particular political project, despite how it does not use the word "in"; also, here's an example from Avatar.)
A model of "believing in"
My model is that "I believe in X" means "I believe X will yield good returns if resources are invested in it." Or, in some contexts, "I am investing (some or ~all of) my resources in keeping with X."
(Backgro...
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