Alexander v. NAACP (Redistricting / Gerrymandering)

 Alexander v. NAACP

The Constitution entrusts state legislatures with the primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts, and legislative redistricting is an inescapably political enterprise. Claims that a map is unconstitutional because it was drawn to achieve a partisan end are not justiciable in federal court. By contrast, if a legislature gives race a predominant role in redistricting decisions, the resulting map is subjected to strict scrutiny and may be held unconstitutional. These doctrinal lines collide when race and partisan preference are highly correlated. This Court has endorsed two related propositions when navigating this tension. First, a party challenging a map’s constitutionality must disentangle race and politics to show that race was the legislature’s “predominant” motivating factor. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 916. Second, the Court starts with a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith. To disentangle race from other permissible considerations, plaintiffs may employ some combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 291. Where race and politics are highly correlated, a map that has been gerrymandered to achieve a partisan end can look very similar to a racially gerrymandered map. Thus, in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the high bar for a racial-gerrymandering claim when they failed to produce an alternative map showing that a rational legislature sincerely driven by its professed partisan goals would have drawn a different map with greater racial balance. Id., at 258. Without an alternative map, the Court also found it difficult for plaintiffs to defeat the starting presumption that the legislature acted in good faith. 

Held: 1. The District Court’s finding that race predominated in the design of District I in the Enacted Plan was clearly erroneous. 

2. Because the same findings of fact and reasoning that guided the court’s racial-gerrymandering analysis also guided the analysis of the Challengers’ independent vote-dilution claim, that conclusion also cannot stand. The District Court also erred in conflating the two claims. A plaintiff pressing a vote-dilution claim cannot prevail simply by showing that race played a predominant role in the districting process, but rather must show that the State “enacted a particular voting scheme as a purposeful device to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.” Miller, 515 U. S., at 911. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the State’s districting plan “has the purpose and effect” of diluting the minority vote. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 649. In light of these two errors in the District Court’s analysis, a remand is appropriate. Pp. 34–35. Reversed in part and remanded in part. ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,  and GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part III–C. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.